When some animals are more equal than others by Clarke, Steve
Clarke, Steve (2020) When some animals are more equal than others. Animal 
Sentience 29(33) 
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1625 
This article has appeared in the journal Animal Sentience, 
a peer-reviewed journal on animal cognition and feeling. It 
has been made open access, free for all, by WellBeing 
International and deposited in the WBI Studies 
Repository. For more information, please contact 
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org. 





 When some animals are more equal than others 
Commentary on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds 
 
Steve Clarke 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Charles Sturt University 
 
Abstract:  Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that we should attribute moral standing not only 
to vertebrates but also to certain invertebrates. M&P also object on ethical grounds to policies 
of scientific funding agencies that encourage scientists to replace vertebrates by invertebrates 
in research. M&P do allow that some invertebrates with brains may have lower levels of moral 
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Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) make the case for attributing moral standing to 
invertebrates with brains, alongside vertebrates. One of their motivations is to oppose 
policies of scientific funding agencies that encourage scientists to replace vertebrates with 
invertebrates in research, where possible, on ethical grounds. M&P note, approvingly, that 
some regulatory bodies now discourage experimentation on cephalopod molluscs, such as 
octopus, squid and cuttlefish. But they regard policies that treat a few species of invertebrates 
as ‘honorary vertebrates’ as not going far enough – although they do not advocate going as 
far as some Jain monks, who “sweep the floor before them … to avoid stepping on scurrying 
ants and beetles”. 
 
Why are M&P reconciled to the prospect of some invertebrates, to whom they attribute 
moral standing, continuing to being stepped on by humans, and thereby killed or maimed? 
One reason they suggest, following McMahan (2002), is that death may not constitute a harm 
for animals that lack an interest in a valuable future. But ants and beetles do not always die 
immediately after being stepped on. In some cases they may suffer for a period of time before 
dying, or they may survive, but with physical impairments that reduce their welfare. M&P 
address such concerns by suggesting that although some invertebrates with brains have 
moral standing, they do not share the same level of moral status as vertebrates. M&P suggest 
that we humans need not be expected to “shoulder unpalatable moral burdens” in 
“drastically altering our lifeways” when we attribute low levels of moral status to ants and 
beetles. The moral status of mice and hamsters is presumably high enough to justify the moral 
demand to avoid stepping on them, but the moral status of ants and beetles is not. 
 
Although the appeal to different levels of moral status addresses the ‘Jain monk problem’, it 
appears to conflict with M&P’s case against vertebrate replacement policies in research. 





Consider a simple hypothetical rescue scenario on the way we typically respond to the 
competing interests of beings with differing levels of moral status: We can save either a 
drowning human with ‘full moral status’ or a drowning chimpanzee with a lower level of moral 
status, but not both. There is overwhelming agreement that we should save the human and 
allow the chimpanzee to die in this scenario. If our reason was that we accord partial moral 
status to the chimpanzee -- say, 18%, compared to 100% for the human -- then in a choice 
between saving one human or six chimpanzees, we would save the six chimpanzees (108%). 
But most of us would not sacrifice the life of a human to save six, sixty or even six hundred 
chimpanzees. 
 
We don’t usually try to weigh the competing interests of beings with different levels of moral 
status as M&P seem to think. More typically, we treat the interests of beings with higher 
levels of moral status as trumping the interests of those with lower levels. This is not just 
anthropocentrism. We would be unlikely to sacrifice the welfare of one chimpanzee to 
prevent harm to six, sixty or six hundred ants. We also presume that hypothetical beings who 
regarded their moral status as higher than ours would regard them as trumping ours. (Agar 
(2013) and other philosophers have urged us not to try to create cognitively enhanced “post 
humans” who may come to regard themselves as having higher moral status than humans.) 
 
M&P’s suggestion that many invertebrates do have some level of moral status, but lower than 
that of many vertebrates, is plausible. But to oppose policies replacing vertebrates with 
invertebrates in research M&P would need to show why it is wrong to let the interests of 
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